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The nature of a public service 
 
Paul Spicker 
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Public services have been misunderstood.  They are not simply services in the public sector, they 
are not necessarily there because of “market failure”, and they cannot be analysed by the same 
criteria as market-based provision.  They have four defining characteristics.  They exist for 
reasons of policy; they provide services to the public; they are redistributive; and they act as a 
trust.  They consequently operate differently from production for profit, in their priorities, costs,  
capacity and outputs.   
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Public services 
 
The definition of any term depends on the way it is used and understood in practice, and so the 
process of understanding what a “public service” is must begin with an examination of its use.  
When the UK Cabinet Office published its recent review of public service reform, it did not 
explain directly what a “public service” is, but it did claim: 
“we have restored our nation’s pride in our public services  and they are more firmly than 
ever part of the fabric of British national life. Some of our public services have done even 
better. Our top schools, hospitals, universities, and police forces – as well as our armed 
forces - are admired  around the world. But we should also not shy away from the fact 
that in some places public services are still not good enough ...” (Cabinet Office, 2008, p 
5) 
There is clearly a sense here of what the public services include: they cover education, health, 
policing and defence.  In another document, the focus extends to social housing, income 
maintenance, community and family services. (HM Government, 2007)   It seems possible to say 
that the term “public services” is typically applied to 
• activities of government in the public domain, such as policing and public health; 
• activities done for the benefit of the public, like public service broadcasting or 
rubbish collection; and  
• ‘social services’, like medical care, housing, education and social care.   
 
This might seem to imply a definition by function, but public services cannot be identified 
simply in terms of the things they do.  Services like energy supply, medical care or transport can 
be public services, but they can also be commercial activities.   Some public services deliver 
 2
things that might, in other circumstances, be considered to be part of industrial production - 
communications, roads, or water.  Government support for industry or agriculture is not 
commonly thought of in terms of public service, but it could be: crop insurance has been treated 
in some Southern European countries as a form of social security.  Many public services have 
developed organically - or haphazardly - rather than by design.   That could be taken to imply 
that the distinctions are conventional, and irrational; it may not be possible to apply firm, clear 
criteria to justify the identification of a service as “public”.    
The term “public service” is used not just descriptively, but normatively.  Saying that something 
is a public service makes a moral claim about the way that organisations should behave.  So, for 
example, there have been claims that “public services” might include: 
 
• Post Offices:  “Britain is a place where the Post Office cannot be understood 
merely as a business seeking profits: it should be understood like sanitation or 
public parks or the NHS, which are things that make life liveable and which are 
maintained for the public good. We are happy to pay for them, both at the counter 
and via the tax system, but they must at all costs be understood as services.”  
(O’Hagan, 2008) 
• Banking: “The Canadian banking system ... has always been considered as a 
public service.” (Canadian Parliament, 1998)  
• Public telephones: “This phone box is needed in case of emergency and regarded 
as an important public service” (Waverley Council, 2008); or 
• Pharmacies:  “Is the pharmacy a public service?   The answer to this question is: 
yes!  And how could it be otherwise?” (Cini, n.d.)  
 
The claim to be a public service is being used in these examples to make a case, that there is 
something about these issues which cannot be determined simply by commercial criteria.  By 
contrast, it is also possible to see the opposite claim: 
“The railway serves the public, but that does not make it a public service” (Hibbs, 2007) 
These statements seem to be directed to the role and function of services, not to questions of 
definition.  To say that something is a public service is to make a value judgment about the 
nature and character of the activity which is being undertaken.    
 The substantial literature on the public services - covering issues like public service 
implementation, finance delivery, motivation, management or accountability - largely passes 
over the question of what a public service is.  A clutch of books with “public service” in the title 
either assume we know (e.g. Common, Flynn, Mellon, 1992; Pollitt, 1993; Lawton, McKevitt, 
1996), or take it that discussion of public services is equivalent to the role of the public sector 
(e.g. Willocks, Harrow, 1992; Farnham, Horton, 1996).  The very fact that they are using the 
term so prominently implies that there is something different, distinctive and recognisable about 
the term.   This paper is concerned with definitions, because understanding what public services 
are, and how they are different from other kinds of agency, is the key to understanding normative 
arguments associated with the idea.   There are three main stages to the argument.  The first is to 
consider what a public service is.  The second is to review the main normative arguments in the 
light of that discussion. The third is to examine the implications of those arguments for the 
operation of the services.  
 
Understanding the public services 
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Public policy 
The first question to address is: what is ‘public’ about the public services?  I need to begin by 
clearing up a common confusion.  The public services are not the same thing as the public sector, 
despite their identification in standard texts (e.g. in Bailey, 2002, ch 2, of Flynn, 2007).  The 
public sector is owned or at least controlled by government; the public services may not be.  
Some public services are instituted, developed and operated by independent, voluntary and non-
profit organisations.   They include, for example: 
 
• Independently provided libraries: “(Carnegie) Public libraries have served the 
community well for generations. They have been providing a public service 
though a period which has seen major lifestyle changes in society.”  (  Southern 
Education Library Board, 2006) 
• Public service broadcasting: “We are fully committed to providing a public 
service without public funding” (The CEO of Setanta, in the Irish Independent, 
2009) 
• Voluntary emergency services: “organisations that are, in effect, providing a 
public service when responding to emergency circumstances ... such as Mountain 
Rescue and the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, which are not part of the 
public sector but, as we all understand, effectively perform a public role and a 
public duty.” (Hansard, 2007)  
Other examples might be universities, which are in the public sector in some countries but in 
others are independent non-profit organisations; social housing, often administered by voluntary 
housing associations; or job centres in France (the Assédics) which were developed and are run 
by a convention between employers and trades unions (Bolderson, Mabbett, 1997). 
 The public sector, by contrast, includes many activities which would not usually be 
considered to be public services.  Examples might be 
 
• operating the functions of government (e.g. the legislature, the civil service or the 
courts),  
• making money for the government (including nationalised industries), or  
• providing services to government agencies, the role in the UK of bodies like the 
Defence Procurement Agency or the National School of Government.  
 
The movement to privatise services to government - examples in the UK include the former 
Information Technology Services Agency, the Recruitment and Assessment Services Agency 
and the Buying Agency - has meant that the remaining government action is increasingly focused 
on core public services.  That is not the same thing, however, as saying that public services are 
public sector activities.    
 The European Union has framed its policies on the basis that public services are in the 
public sector: “in principle, public services are the responsibility of public authorities.” 
(European Commission, 2005, p 25)   The Public Services Directive (European Union 
92/50/EEC), so-called, is actually about public service contracts, or  procurement, rather than 
public services.  The public services are not about provision by the state, or provision on behalf 
of the state, but provision for the public, whether or not it is done by public authorities. They 
may be linked to government activities, but they are not confined to government, and 
government does not cover the full range of such activities. Some public services are in the 
public sector, some are independent, and many straddle the boundaries - there is a complex 
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interplay of different approaches to regulation, finance and provision (Judge, Knapp, 1985).  The 
terms, and the concepts, are distinct. 
   The kinds of services identified above as public services - policing, education, defence 
or the establishment of communications – look, and feel, different from commercial activity.  
The public services might be generally supposed to improve the public welfare.    The  
identification with “welfare” is clumsy, however; it might imply that an activity like defence is a 
public service when it increases welfare and that it is not a public service when it decreases it.   
Conventionally, in public sector economics, imposed preferences which are taken to represent 
the interests of the public are identified as “merit wants” (Musgrave, 1959)  or “merit goods” 
(Bailey, 2002): goods which are chosen because of normative judgments about value, rather than 
the exercise of individual choice.  But the terminology is misleading: merit wants or goods are 
not necessarily wants or goods at all.  The judgments that are being made are decisions in public 
policy.  
 Perhaps a better way of saying that services are “public”, then, is to say that they are 
developed for reasons of public policy.  Public services are intended,  not to meet the objectives 
or preferences of consumers or producers, but to further objectives that policy-makers consider 
desirable - whoever those policy makers may be, because the term might include not just 
government, but governing bodies, voluntary organisations, mutualist societies, philanthropists 
and others.  Bozeman suggests that “publicness” is “a characteristic of an organisation which 
reflects the extent the organisation is influenced by political authority.”  (Bozeman, 
Bretschneider, 1994, p 197).  Both public services and the public sector are public in this sense.  
However, the influence of policy only offers a limited explanation for the differences between 
public services and other kinds of organisation; public services have characteristics that other 
public organizations do not, and private industry is also influenced by political authority  (Boyne, 
2002, 98).  To understand what makes public services different, we need more than publicness 
alone. 
 
Public service 
The second key question is: what is it about the public services that identifies them as 
“services”?  Public services “serve” members of the public - they provide goods or services to 
individuals, families and communities.   This is not about the distinction between the production 
of “services” and “goods” (as in Jordan, 2006).  The public services are not services in the sense 
of the term that distinguishes “services” from manufacturing industry, construction or energy 
production, or the sense in which the European Union has distinguished services from other 
aspects of production.   McKevitt  identifies public services with professional and personal 
services, where “the product and the activity of production are identical” (McKevitt, 1998, p 8)  
That is appealing, because it clearly applies to medical care, social work or education, but the 
idea of public services is wider than that; it also includes issues like communications, roads and 
sewers.  The idea of service is contained in the relationship between the activity and the public, 
rather than the form of its production. 
 There are publicly sponsored activities which do nothing directly for the public, such as 
nature reserves which protect species by excluding human beings.  They can be argued to 
provide some public benefit, but what they are doing is not a service to members of the public.   
This is just the debate that has been conducted in English Nature: 
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“Staff were asked what they did, and some said they were there to provide a service to 
wildlife. I said: ‘Well, actually, English Nature is a public service. We serve people.’” 
(Davies, 2003) 
The same sentiment helps to explain why some public sector activities, like services to 
government, are not usually thought of as  “public services”: their service is not for the public.  
The provision of goods and services to agencies, organisations, or government is a different kind 
of activity.  
 As I have already commented, the idea of ‘service’ is not just descriptive.  The public 
services are supposed to have, as in the claim made above for lifeboats, “a public role and a 
public duty”. Some writers emphasise the values of providers – the “public service ethos” – as a 
characteristic element in the provision of public services (Farnham, Horton, 1996; Flynn, 2007).  
Public services are supposed to be motivated by a sense of mutual responsibility - a sentiment 
often referred to in the European Union as “solidarity” (Spicker, 2006a, part 3).  The examples of 
claims given so far seem to suggest that being a public service is something praiseworthy, other-
regarding (if not actually altruistic) and inclusive.  
 It is difficult to identify a clear expression of these principles in recent literature on the 
public services, but Richard Titmuss, writing in the 1960s and 70s, focused his argument on the 
admittedly hazy distinction between public and social services (e.g. Titmuss, 1974, ch 9).    The 
crucial difference between public and social services was that the clients of social services were 
considered dependent in a way that did not apply to people who receive public services.   For 
Titmuss, the public services were a model of what he came to call “institutional” welfare, where 
provision for socially recognised needs was accepted as an institutional part of social life. 
(Titmuss 1968, 1974; Reisman, 1977)  The patterns of public service represented an expression 
of “gift-reciprocity” in society through the development of universal provision. (Titmuss 1971)  
Titmuss’s work is one of the strongest expressions of public service as a normative position.  
 
Redistribution 
Another of the normative elements seems to be that public service is either non-commercial or, 
in some sense, beyond the commercial.  For McKevitt, this is about “non-marketability” 
(McKevitt, 1998, ch 1); for Flynn, it is about finance, that services are not evidently for sale 
(Flynn, 2007, p 8).  This is suggestive, but neither identifies the issues clearly.  One of the 
recurring clichés in claims for public service  is that they are concerned with “a public service, 
not a business” (there are over three hundred examples of that phrase on Google).   The key to 
being non-commercial is that public services are redistributive, in the sense that those who pay 
are not necessarily those who receive.   A firm which sells soup to the public is not providing a 
“public service”, even if it is very good soup, but an agency which distributes soup to homeless 
people is.  A commercial theatre is not providing a public service, but “public service” 
broadcasting can carry a transmission of the play they put on to a non-paying audience.  
Commercial organisations that are placed under a “public service obligation” are being asked to 
provide services regardless of their commercial priorities.  If a public service charges for its 
services, the charge is not intended to be proportionate to the benefit.  This means that the benefit 
which people receive is paid for by others, either individually or collectively.  
 Redistribution may be an objective of public services, a point I will return to later, but the 
intention to redistribute is not the defining principle: rather, the process is that public services 
allocate resources.  Redistribution is an inevitable concomitant of that process. (Musgrave sees 
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redistributive allocation as a function of government: Musgrave, 1959, pp 6 ff.  However, the 
allocation does not have to be done only by government: any charity, any mutual insurer, is also 
redistributing resources.)  
 
Operation as a trust 
These three elements - public policy, service and redistribution - lead to the fourth.  In economic 
terms, the policy-maker, not the consumer,  is the purchaser of services.   Conventional 
economic analysis depends largely on an understanding of the relationship between supply and 
demand, between the producer and consumer.  In the development of public services, however, 
there is a disjuncture between these different elements.  Schools, prisons, hospitals and 
residential care homes are often developed in a quasi-market, where mechanisms which may 
seem at first blush to be like the operation of market but are marked by a disconnection between 
demand and service receipt. That disconnection is one of the reasons why so many governments 
have developed provision in these fields; they are areas where, even if the market operates, it 
does not necessarily operate in the way that textbooks suggest a market might be expected to 
work.   
 The  characteristic nature of public services is that such services are operated as a trust.  
What these examples all have in common is a mechanism in which A pays B to provide a service 
for C.  Although A and B are often parts of the government, this mechanism is not unique to 
government: it is also the standard pattern of operation for voluntary and charitable 
organisations.  Examples include voluntary hospitals, independent schools and various exercises 
in corporate social responsibility. However, a voluntary trust  which did not have the other 
characteristics of public services, such as service to the public or redistribution, would not be a 
public service.  (An example might be a closed religious foundation.) 
 The operation of a public service is sometimes described as the action of an agent on 
behalf of a principal (Millward et al, 1983; Besley, Ghatak, 2003, 238-9), but that is not a 
particularly helpful formulation.  Agency is usually seen as a process where the principal has the 
primary responsibility for action, and discharges it by commissioning an agent or delegating 
authority.  That is true of some activities funded by the state, but it does not apply in many other 
cases.  Many voluntary trusts, performing a public service, do what they do because they were 
set up to do it long ago.  In several of the examples considered earlier - such as lifeboats, 
libraries, or public service broadcasters - there is no evident principal, while in others, like 
housing associations or universities, it can be unclear who the supposed principal is. The normal 
pattern of trusts is that the trustee - the provider of the service, not the funder - bears the primary 
responsibility, and determines the pattern of service provision.   
 
There are, then, four defining characteristics of public services.  Public services exist for reasons 
of public policy; they provide services to the public; they are redistributive; and they operate as a 
trust.  All four elements are necessary to the definition.  Many nationalised industries, like state-
run  coal production or car manufacture, can be said to have be based on public policy, but they 
are not necessarily delivered on non-commercial criteria, even when they have elements of 
subsidy; in those cases, they are not thought of as public services.  Public sector activities which 
are not services to members of the public, like services to government, are excluded because they 
do not meet the second criterion.  Activities which are not redistributive and which charge 
commercial rates to consumers, like publicly provided car parking, are excluded because they do 
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not meet the third.  A public lottery might arguably meet the first three criteria (though the 
characterisation of a lottery as a “service” is uncertain), but it does not meet the fourth.  It 
follows that people who claim that something ought to be a public service, like posts, or 
telecommunications, or transport, are drawing on a complex construct, with several elements.  
They seem to be saying that these issues should be guided by public policy rather than 
commercial considerations; that they should serve the public; that they do not exist only for 
customers with the ability to pay; and that they should be prepared for some people to pay for the 
benefit of others.   
 
 
Justifying public services 
 
Public policy 
The case for public service depends crucially on the proposition that a policy decision has to be 
made.  What happens when decisions are left to the spontaneous interaction of individuals and 
groups - the “market” - are not satisfactory.  Social criteria have to be applied instead.  
  Justification of this position typically takes three forms.   One is purely normative.  Some 
things, and some states of being, are better than others.  Morality is not subjective or individual; 
it is social in nature, and for it to work there have to be some shared values.  Flynn emphasizes 
the importance of the values guiding the public service, citing Patricia Hewitt: 
“we do ourselves a disservice when we use the jargon of markets, instead of coming back 
to our values, the values of public service.”  (Flynn, 2007, p 99). 
 The second main justification is that there is social value which is not accounted for by 
individual preferences.  An example is the “herd immunity” that can be obtained through 
vaccination of a population - an example, simultaneously, of social value and externalities which 
are not otherwise accounted for in individual actions. (Musgrave refers to these aggregate 
preferences as “social wants”: 1959, p 13.)  This is partly covered by the arguments about social 
or public goods and market failure, which will be discussed later, but it extends beyond that.  
This is related to the idea of “social capital”, which suggests that something about the character 
of society itself is lost when people act exclusively in accordance with individual interests 
(Putnam, 2000, ch 19).  Social capital refers to the value of networks of social interaction. The 
economic market depends on a social infrastructure, like support for children and old people, 
relationships in communities, or interpersonal trust; where these things do not exist, or more 
typically where they are impaired, it has substantial implications for the viability and costs of 
private enterprise.  Social capital is not truly a form of “capital”, then - it cannot be accumulated 
or transferred - but it has economic consequences.  A further, different kind of example might be 
the protection of human rights - an issue which is often interpreted in individualistic terms.  
Although human rights often operate at the level of the individual, they invite a broader question: 
what kind of society do people want to live in?  That question is asked because the broader issues 
of principle are taken to be no less important than the position of individuals.  Issues like the rule 
of law, the protection of minorities or the moral status of a society are issues of social value, and 
steps to protect them commonly fall within the remit of public services. 
 The third justification is more complex.  Musgrave’s distinction between individual and 
social wants is still a difference between individual and aggregate objectives.  However, there are 
also collective social objectives, and the results of collective decisions may legitimately look 
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different from aggregate individualised preferences.  “The whole purpose of public services”, 
Flynn suggests, “is … to collectively provide protection, help, restraint, education, recreation and 
care outside market relationships.”  (Flynn, 2007, 5)    
 It is a familiar proposition, from much of the economic literature, that it is not possible to 
derive a social preference simply from the sum of individual preferences, or vice-versa (see Sen, 
1979).   It is much less common to see the corollary: that in some cases individual perspectives 
might be preferable, and in other cases social ones might be.  Social objectives might be 
preferred because the objections to the outcomes of individual choices are moralistic - for 
example, complaints about the consequences of alcohol, which result from the voluntary 
behaviour of informed individuals. Galbraith’s condemnation of “private affluence and public 
squalor” (Galbraith, 1958) is partly a complaint about the elevation of individual priorities over 
shared ones.  But there is another rationale.   The consequences of legitimate and rational 
individual decisions, may, when viewed in aggregate, imply different choices from the position 
preferred by a collective perspective.  
 The principle can be illustrated by the case of Jaymee Bowen, “Child B”.  She was a 
young girl suffering from leukaemia, whose prospects of recovery were very limited.  Jaymee 
was denied further treatment by the local health authority on the basis that treatment was painful 
and outcomes were poor; the odds of her surviving were about 1%.  Her father pressed for 
treatment, on the basis that she had no other options.  From her father’s point of view, the choice 
for his daughter was either to take a treatment with a limited chance of success, or to die.  The 
view from the health authority was significantly different.   Odds of 1 in 100 do not mean that a 
health authority is gambling with a single child’s life; they mean that when the health authority 
has 100 children to serve, the likelihood is that one will live and 99 will die.  In order to achieve 
that result, the health authority has to be prepared to put all 100 children through a painful, 
distressing programme of treatment.  This is a different kind of decision, both morally and 
practically, from the one that individuals have to make.  In the case of Jaymee Bowen, both the 
responsible medics, and the health authority, felt that they could not justify treating her in these 
circumstances. (Ham, Pickard, 1998, pp 20-1).   
 Now, it is open to anyone, looking at this example, to say that the father’s decision was 
the right one.  That is what the court decided.  However, it cannot be supposed that this is the 
only possible basis for a decision - or, as some individualists seem to argue, that such an issue 
can only be considered legitimately from an individual perspective.  Nor can this be seen simply 
as the imposition of government preferences on individual choice: the dismissal of collective 
social perspectives in the economic literature as “merit wants” is a misunderstanding.  The 
consideration of “public policy”, or of the social consequences of combined individual decisions 
- which are, incidentally, admissible arguments respectively in English and US law - make it 
possible to take into account other considerations besides the outcomes of aggregate individual 
decisions.  If it is right to argue that the collective consequences of decisions have also to be 
taken into account, there has to be some mechanism by which those consequences can be 
considered.   
 
The provision of services   
The establishment of social or collective objectives is not equivalent to the claim that services 
ought to be provided.  Public policy is often realised through some of the other mechanisms of 
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government - regulation, incentive, subsidy, bargaining and so forth.  There needs to be a further 
stage in the argument.   
 Services are provided in the public sector when they cannot be done adequately in the 
private sector (Atkinson, Stiglitz, 1980, 5-6).  The core problem, consequently, could be 
understood as “market failure” (cf Connolly, Munro, 2006, ch 9).  The association of public 
services with deficiencies in the market is routinely cited as one of the characteristic purposes of 
public services (e.g. McKevitt, 1998; Bailey, 2002); the UK Treasury’s guidance suggests that 
this is the primary justification for the establishment of public services. (HM Treasury, n.d., ch. 
3)  Market failure in the technical sense means that markets are unable to work as they should.  
This happens, typically, because of assymetric information, externalities  or the argument 
relating to public goods - that some goods have characteristics, such as non-divisibility,  which 
interfere with their distribution in the market (e.g. in Bailey, 2002; Flynn, 2007, p 8).    
 The weakness of this model is that one of the defining characteristics of public services is 
the service they offer to people directly.  Rather than being non-divisible, many public services – 
like health, social care or pensions – are quite the opposite.  Market failure may be a possible 
argument for developing public services, but it is only part of a much wider case. For Atkinson 
and Stiglitz, the key arguments concern imperfect competition, the failure of markets to achieve 
full equilibrium, the lack of a futures or insurance market, and distributive issues (Atkinson, 
Stiglitz, 1980); for Bailey, the main issues are public goods, merit goods , externalities and 
transaction costs (Bailey, 2002); while Besley and Ghatak “suggest that public services are goods 
that an unregulated market will tend to under-provide”, because of external benefits, 
egalitarianism and merit goods. (Besley, Ghatak, 2003, p 236).    These formulations mix market 
failure, then, with a more general normative concern with public policy objectives.  There are 
things which we may wish to do which are decided by other criteria than the market. Whether 
this is determined by the demands of morality, religion, humanitarianism, human rights, 
citizenship, security, defence or the national interest, there may be reasons for doing things that 
have nothing to do with the preferences of consumers or producers or the aggregate choices of 
individuals.  
 The issue is not that markets work imperfectly; that might be a reason to get them to 
work better.  It is that if even they do work perfectly, they will not produce the desired effects.   
Services like the armed forces, universal education, fire fighting, roads and drainage have 
developed in most countries not through the vicissitudes of the market but through acts of public 
policy.  This is not a response to “market failure”, because in the terms of economic analysis the 
exclusion of some people or the acceptance of risk, or non-provision where there is no demand, 
is not a failure.  The problem is more fundamental: there is simply no mechanism in markets to 
make it all happen. 
 
Redistribution   
The redistribution which characterises public services is mainly an expression of collectivism 
rather than egalitarianism: as soon as collective provision is made, it will have some 
redistributive implications.  The redistributive character of collective provision might be seen as 
an objection to public service: if governments have no legitimate basis on which to redistribute 
income, they cannot legitimately undertake measures which have redistributive effects (Nozick, 
1974).    Even Nozick, however, who holds that all redistribution is illegitimate, still does not 
wish to defend the existing distribution.  The collectivist response is that the way things are is not 
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the way that they have to be, and there is no reason why any government, or any society, has to 
accept that the initial distribution of property arising from history, inheritance, legitimate 
transactions, violence, fraud and luck should override every other sort of moral consideration. 
 There are many different kinds of argument for redistribution.  Some are functional: 
public goods are provided for by pooling costs, and social protection and insurance work by 
pooling risks.  Some are humanitarian: redistribution is the way in which poorer people can be 
supported.  Some are universalist: if provision is to be made for everyone without exception, for 
example for education or public health, it can only be done redistributively.  And some (though 
by no means all) are egalitarian: many commentators have argued that the dispersion of rewards 
and resources is unjust or divisive, and the reduction of that dispersion is itself desirable.    
 The argument for redistribution does not in itself justify public services.  Arthur Seldon 
argues that if one desires to redistribute resources, such redistribution can still be done within the 
framework of the market. (Seldon, 1977) The only service that is needed, in that approach, is the 
service of redistribution itself.  This is the approach behind income maintenance or social 
security - paying people so that they can buy food or other necessities, rather than providing 
them with food, is an approach which intrinsically favours the operation of the market. The 
egalitarian case for redistributing via public services, rather than through the redistribution of 
resources, comes in two varieties.  The core argument is that it is difficult to meet egalitarian 
criteria relating to access, rights or universal coverage by market distribution.  The pursuit of 
efficiency in the private sector generally requires some degree of adverse selection, or exclusion, 
by independent providers.  This implies a two-tier system: private services have to be 
supplemented by residual protection for those who are left out.   This is intrinsically unequal: 
residual welfare has been regarded as intrinsically stigmatising, socially divisive and associated 
with inferior services (e.g. in Townsend, 1976). 
 The other main egalitarian argument for the provision of public services rather than 
redistribution is instrumental rather than principled.  The provision of public services has been 
seen in itself as an important instrument for achieving equality.  Tawney argued that expenditure 
on public services was the most effective way of achieving equality in the ways that mattered. 
The strategy of equality he favoured was 
the pooling of its surplus resources by means of taxation, and the use of the funds thus 
obtained to make accessible to all, irrespective of their income, occupation or social 
position, the conditions of civilisation which, in the absence of such measures, can only 
be enjoyed by the rich. ( Tawney, 1930, p 122) 
This approach guided the Labour Party in the UK for much of the period immediately after the 
World War 2. (Le Grand, 1982)   It is important to recognise, though, that although egalitarian 
arguments may support the development of public services, the arguments for public services are 
not dependent on such arguments.   
 
Operation as a trust 
One of the most obvious justifications of the operation of services as a trust is also one of the 
most controversial - the idea that people should be provided for although they have not made the 
choice themselves, an approach often castigated as “paternalistic”.  The key justifications for 
paternalism, Dworkin suggests, are that people may not appreciate the consequences of their 
actions; that they may not act responsibly otherwise; or that they lack the capacity to make a 
decision.(Dworkin, 1981)  These arguments are tainted with a fairly negative view of the 
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capacity of citizens; there are other, less judgmental, positions.  Paternalism, in the sense of 
provision without prior consent, can increase freedom, for example by mitigating the negative 
effects on freedom of remote risks which individuals might otherwise have accepted. (Spicker, 
2006a, ch 1)   Paternalistic action may be a convenient delegation of general authority to 
government - unless one begins from the position that all actions affecting the public have to be 
approved through a process of direct democracy, someone is going to be making a decision on 
other people’s behalf.  Paternalistic action may supplement people’s capacity.    Extending 
collective insurance on a compulsory basis has proved to be necessary to extend protection to 
those who are most disadvantaged; the compulsion which operates for inclusion of the lowest 
paid workers in social insurance is principally a compulsion on their employers.  Voluntarism 
only works if people have the power to act.     
 The most fundamental reason for operating public services as a trust, however, is done 
without reference to individual choice.  It  stems from their character as a form of collective 
provision.  It is in the nature of collective provision that the individuals who pay for services, 
who make administrative decisions, who receive services or who are affected by collective 
measures are not necessarily the same people.  That is not an objection to collective provision.  A 
focus on individuals, central as it is to political and economic critiques of collective provision, is 
not the only way that activities can be justified.   
 
How public services operate 
 
It used to be axiomatic in studies of public administration that public administration is different 
from private management (Boyne, 2002). That proposition has taken a battering, partly because 
of the translation of private sector models into public administration, but also because attempts to 
capture the difference between the models has been disappointingly elusive.  Coursey and 
Bozeman, for example, found only that the explanatory power of publicness, understood either in 
terms of ownership or in terms of public policy, was limited. (Coursey, Bozeman, 1990)  Boyne’s 
review of the impact of publicness (understood as the influence of public policy) on public 
organisations identifies a series of issues relating to organisation and management.  The ways in 
which public organisations differ from private ones include  
• The organisational environment – issues of complexity, openness to external events, 
instability and the absence of competition; 
• Organisational goals, such as  issues of equity and accountability 
• Organisational structures, such as bureaucracy, red tape and the reduction of managerial 
autonomy, and 
• Differences in managerial values – the “public service ethos”.  (Boyne, 2002) 
The implication of this analysis is that public policy, at least, has an effect on the pattern of 
behaviour of a public organisation.  However, the relationship between ‘publicness’ and the 
distinctive pattern of public organisations seems tenuous.    In this section, I want to argue that 
there is a structural relationship between the character of public services and the evidence that 
public organisations behave differently. 
 The most obvious difference between public and private is accounted for by 
responsiveness to public policy.  This implies differences in organizational goals and potentially 
in managerial values.  Basing decisions on public policy, rather than the aggregation of individual 
preferences, leads to different allocative decisions.   Because the priorities determined by public 
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policy are intended to produce outcomes which have not otherwise been produced, it is fairly safe 
to say that they will never be equivalent to the processes or outcomes of the kind of market 
represented in texbooks of economic theory - a system based on aggregated individual 
preferences.   Kaplow and Shavell argue that the provision and distribution of resources 
determined by public policy cannot be Pareto-optimal. (Kaplow, Shavell, 2001)   That is probably 
right, but it misses the point.  There is no particular reason to suppose that the effective demand 
for public services is supposed to reflect, or to be influenced by, the aggregate preferences of 
individuals.  Pareto optimality is a greatly overrated principle: it is probably not compatible, Sen 
suggests, with general principles like individual freedom or human rights. (Sen, 1979, ch 6) The 
choices made in the formation of policy are not determined in the same way, and not necessarily 
even concerned with the same issues.  
 There are three main objections to taking this as a sufficient explanation for the 
differences between public services and other organizations.  The first is that there is not one 
thing called “public policy”.  Policy is not necessarily made because outcomes are being chosen, 
explicitly or even implicitly; it is as likely to be based on the development of legitimate processes 
and procedures, on symbolic action, on negotiated compromise, or on “path dependency” - doing 
things because that is the way they were done previously.  Policies for education, public health or 
child protection depend on a complex set of political contexts and policy rationales, and policy-
makers are not simply acting as consumers: policies have to be negotiated, constructed and 
developed.    Most contemporary models of policy emphasise its contested, political character, 
rather than the exercise of choice (e.g. Stone, 1997; Colebatch, 1998; Sabatier, 1999).  There is 
not, then, a single, simple model of public policy; public policies are diverse.     If there are 
conflicting signals, there should be a disparate set of behaviours.   
 The second objection is that there is no obvious explanation here for the differences in 
organizational structures.  The economic analysis of public services usually depends on the same 
concepts and techniques as those used to analyse market-based transactions - considerations like 
cost, choice and efficiency (e.g. Connolly and Munro, 2006;  Millward et al, 1983).  If the 
difference between public and private services was only a matter of public policy or “publicness”, 
a conventional economic analysis would still hold good; differences between preferences shape 
the  choices, but the process of balancing choices against constraints is one which every producer 
has to deal with.  Boyne considers the argument, from public choice theory,  that the influence of 
public funding makes producers responsive to funders rather than to service users (Boyne, 2002.  
That is plausible, but leaves it unclear why services that are not dependent on public funding 
should do likewise.   
 The third problem is that the explanation is focused on the public sector rather than the 
public services.  The claim that public organizations operate in a distinctive, non-competitive  
environment is not necessarily true; many voluntary services, and hybrids like posts and 
telecommunications, share an environment with commercial competititors.  The empirical studies 
tend to dilute the evidence by mixing up public services with publicly owned organizations, and 
not considering public services that  are not in public ownership.    If the distinction between 
public and private organisations is a “puzzle” (Bozeman, Bretschneider, 1994), it is perhaps 
because it has been under-conceptualized.   “Publicness” is not enough.   
 Public services have three other features apart from their responsiveness to policy: the  
service relationship, redistribution, and their operation as a trust.  Redistribution, and the non-
commercial character of many transactions, reinforce the sense of difference, but those features 
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may still be contained within a model of economic preference.  The implication of the service 
relationship is that they will serve users; but the operation as a trust implies that this will not be 
through a financial relationship with users as consumers.  It is in the nature of public service that 
demand is separate from purchase, and it follows that the signals which economic markets 
depend on are not available.   
 The general test that is applied to the operation of trusts, and to public services, is 
consequently different from a commercial activity.  Trusts are not necessarily profit-maximising, 
because the terms on which the trusts are established tend to distinguish providers of public 
service from commercial operations (cf Besley, Ghatak, 2003, 238); nor are they predictably 
utility- or preference-maximising.  That is not what they are set up to do.  The key issue is 
effectiveness - that is, whether or not the trust has achieved its specified aims (cf Boyne, 2003).  
There may be public services where allocative decisions are based on a trade-off between 
marginal costs and marginal benefits, as economists suggest (e.g. Eckstein, 1967, p 24; Connolly 
and Munro, 2006), but this is not the normal expectation of public services.  Rather, they are 
typically supposed to deliver a specified set of services, inclusively, to a population.  The criteria 
by which they determine the required quantity and level of service are decided not by their 
discretion or choice, but by their terms of reference - to meet, for example, the entitlements of the 
population which is to be served or the requirements over a geographical area.    
 A commercial enterprise is generally constrained in a free market to perform efficiently, 
in the sense of reducing the average cost of producing each unit to a minimum; competition 
between services drives suppliers towards that point.  The utility of a trust, by contrast, is 
optimised through cost-effectiveness - achieving its aims at the lowest possible cost.   The 
difference between the two is shown in figure 1, which is based on the standard economic model 
of a production curve |(reproduced from Spicker, 2006b, p 133).    
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here]  
 
Productive efficiency occurs at the bottom of the curve, where marginal cost equals average cost.  
Cost-effectiveness can occur anywhere along the production line, depending on the objective s of 
policy, but wherever services are inclusive and universal, it tends to be located well up the rising 
part of the curve.  The criticism is often made of public services that they are “inefficient”.  
Public services are not trying to be efficient; they are doing something different.  (That makes it 
difficult to be fully appreciative of the considerable expertise that has been devoted to the 
empirical analysis of productive efficiency in the public services: e.g. Smith, Street, 2005.  It is 
quite possible to identify issues relating to efficiency, but the discussion is puzzling: it is focusing 
on the wrong criteria.)   
 It follows that the processes driving public services are structurally different from those 
which apply in commercial production.   One tendency, which is clear from figure 1,  is to 
produce at a higher average price than the market would, because aligning quantity to average 
costs is inconsistent with effectiveness.  The tendency to work at higher costs is shared by a 
private monopoly, and in some analyses public services are identified with monopolies (e.g. 
Connolly, Munro, 2006, ch 9), but there is no reason to suppose that the pressure is for the same 
higher price as that arrived at by a commercial monopoly supplier.  The response is not 
conditioned by profitability or by demand.  In the special case where there are economies of 
scale, or substantial sunk costs (like a hospital), the marginal costs of responding to 
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predetermined objectives may be limited (Musgrave, 1959).  As marginal costs increase, 
however, it may be inappropriate to curb activity to return to the point of efficiency.  
 We are now in a position to reflect on some of the patterns of behaviour identified by 
Boyne (2002).   First, there were differences in the organizational environment.  I have raised 
doubts about some of the propositions considered here – for example, that public organisations 
operate in non-competitive environments.  What is true is that public services cannot adapt to 
competition in the same way as commercial organizations do.  Public services do not usually 
have the option of “adverse selection” - reducing average costs by avoiding expensive cases - and 
it is questionable whether they should.  It is not difficult to reduce the costs of running a postal 
service by refusing to carry mail to locations which are more remote and expensive to reach, but 
that is inconsistent with the role of the post as a public service. The suggestion that the UK  
National Health Service might fail to deal with expensive treatments on the grounds of cost has 
been met with outrage (cf Hawkes, 2008).   (The principle of “triage”, where it is applied, is 
mainly justified in terms of effectiveness, not efficiency: e.g. Scottish Executive Health 
Department, n.d..)      
 The second set of differences relate to organisational “goals”, such as equity and 
accountability.  There is some circularity in saying that public services are trying to achieve 
certain goals; organisations which are founded to forward policy objectives could hardly do 
anything else.  I think Boyne is really referring under this heading to procedural norms.  
Accountability is a means to an end.  Accountability is understood in many forms – 
“democratic”, financial, legal and administrative; it is emphasized in public service partly 
because of the need to conform with the objectives of policy, but also because many of the 
signals available in the economic market through the price mechanism are not available.  Equity, 
similarly, can be understood as a procedural criterion, because although the principle can be 
substantive – that people are treated proportionately according to their circumstances -   it is also 
a demand for consistency, requiring that like cases should be treated alike.  The term is not 
without its ambiguities, and it is not taken in the same way in different contexts (Legrand, 1987), 
but the emphasis on consistency can be seen as a concomitant of a normative approach to service 
delivery which emphasises rule-based allocations. 
 The norms of public service also have a powerful influence on organisational structures.  
The key concept here is cost-effectiveness.  Because adverse selection is not an option, and the 
quantity of service is not easily reduced, cost-effectiveness  is mainly achieved through the 
elimination of “waste”.  An example is the minimisation of unused capacity; few aspects of the 
UK National Health Service horrify the public and press as much as the thought of empty beds - 
even if maintaining spare capacity is fundamental to the efficient and responsive operation of a 
service. 
 
“An empty hospital bed has been to NHS management what garlic flowers and holy water 
were to Dracula. All hospital beds must be occupied at all times, otherwise there was 
waste.” (Dalrymple, 2000)   
Some commentators see the public services as intrinsically wasteful.  For example, Peters and 
Pierre suggest that public services have been insulated from economic pressure and that they can 
consequently be criticized for fostering organisational slack (Peters, Pierre, 1998, p 223).  The 
evidence for that proposition is based in the disparity between costs in the public and private 
sectors, and that has been explained above in different terms.  Slack is supposed to mean 
something different: that there is a reserve of resources, which can be used to adapt to changes in 
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circumstances (Cyert, March, 1963).  The idea has been translated in studies of the public sector 
into a focus on relative wages (Busch, Gustaffson, 2002), but that only converts into the idea of a 
reserve of resources if one takes the view that labour costs are flexible.   There is in truth little 
tolerance of the kind of organisational slack found in the private sector.   On the contrary, the 
refusal to allow spare capacity can lead to inflexibility, often coupled with obstructive procedural 
rules such as meticulous accounting for minor expenditure.  The issues are not avoided when 
public services are sub-contracted to independent providers: contracts have to be specified and 
monitored to meet the criterion of cost-effectiveness, with the result that the sub-contractor, 
operating under the aegis the public sector, is constrained to work in the same way (Hudson, 
1994).   
 The idea of a “public service ethos” is even more tangled than the central issues being 
discussed in this paper, and I cannot hope to do it justice here.  Boyne refers to a limited range of 
values, such as service to the public and organizational commitment (Boyne, 2002), but the idea 
might include, for example, concepts like altruism, service, trust, integrity, impartiality, fairness 
and partnership.  (Brereton, Temple, 1999).  Part, certainly, reflects principles appropriate to  the 
concept of a public service - for example, a commitment to public policy, to service and to equity 
– but this is overlain with many other values and ideas.  It may be unwise to claim that the public 
services share many principles in common.   There are distinctions between “service ideologies”: 
views and norms about service delivery, generally formed in response to the prevailing 
conditions in particular activities and professions (Smith, 1980; Spicker, 2006b).  If social 
workers focus on risk, housing officers on equity and prison officers on security and support, that 
reflects the pressures, demands and expectations of the work they do.  What is true in each case is 
that, even if the specific values differ, public service tends to be seen as a moral activity, rather 
than an economic one; that is consistent with the normative nature of the concept. 
 Several of the arguments I have reviewed about public services seem to suggest that the 
characteristics of public services are conventional, vague or puzzling.  I have argued, on the 
contrary, that many of the observed patterns of behaviour of public organisations – goals such as 
accountability and effectiveness, organisational structures such as bureaucracy and the reduction 
of waste, and the values of public service - can be explained in structural terms. Public services 
differ from production for profit in their priorities, costs,  capacity and outputs.  The differences 
between public services and other organizations are not only due to the intervention of public 
policy, but to the other characteristics of such services – the relationship with the public, the 
element of redistribution, and the operation of services as a trust.     
   Whether the objectives of public services are desirable, and whether it is right to produce 
at a higher unit cost to achieve social aims, are questions of policy, which depend on normative 
arguments. They are not resolvable empirically.   Measures intended to create conditions which 
will optimise commercial production - like European intervention to develop competition, or 
pressure on public services for productive efficiency - are consequently misplaced.  Public 
services operate in different ways, and by different criteria, than commercial producers do. 
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